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1 A CASE
A and B agree to a joint venture for the common exploitation of A’s coal plant
during the years 2001-2010. The agreement provides among others that B will
every year pay half of the depreciation for the plant estimated at C= 90 million
a year. At the moment when the parties agreed on that amount, they assumed
that the coal plant would have an operating time of 15 years, because the
government had decided to stop all coal plant exploitations from 2016. After
the expiry of the contract the government changes its decision: meanwhile
it is of the opinion that the exploitation of nuclear power plants must be
stopped and that coal plants can serve as an alternative for some decades yet.
The operating time of the coal plant is now estimated to be 30 instead of 15
years. Consequently, B claims modification of the contract, arguing that the
huge extension of the operating time is an unforeseen circumstance and that
therefore the contract has to be modified. A argues that the contract has
already been enforced and expired, and that judicial modification of the
contract is therefore not acceptable anymore.
What to think of A’s position, assuming that the huge extension of the
operating time is, as B argues, an unforeseen circumstance?
2 THE QUESTIONS
Article 6:258 DCC (Dutch Civil Code) states, among others, that the court may
modify (the effects of) a contract or set it aside, in whole or in part, on the
basis of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness, ‘may not expect the contract
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to be maintained in unmodified form’1 (in Dutch: ‘ongewijzigde instandhou-
ding van de overeenkomst niet mag verwachten’).
The word ‘maintained’ suggests at least that the contract still exists at the
moment when modification or setting aside is claimed, and that the contract
is still valid then. Indeed it can be held that a contract which is non-existent
or null cannot be modified on the basis of art. 6:258 DCC: there is nothing to
be changed anymore. The same applies to a contract which has been annulled,
at least if the annulment has been given retroactive effect to the time the
contract was agreed for, as usually occurs on the basis of art. 3:53 DCC. An
interesting question remains whether a valid and unannulled contract for a
definite period can be changed or set aside on the basis of unforeseen circum-
stances, if it has been enforced or has expired because that period is past. And
that is the central issue in this article. At the end the same question will be
considered shortly for some contracts which have expired in another specific
way: a) valid contracts for an indefinite period after termination of the contract,
b) contracts which have been subjected to annulment without retroactive effect
to the time the contract was agreed and c) contracts which have been set aside
on account of breach of contract. Furthermore, some attention will be given
then to the prescription of a claim for the setting aside or modification of such
a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances and to the possibility of
forfeiture of rights.
3 TEXT AND HISTORY OF ART. 6:258, FOREIGN AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW
The text of art. 6:258 does not explicitly give an answer to the questions dealt
with here. We will see that the text does give an interesting indication, but
first some attention to parliamentary history may be useful.
The text of art. 6:258 DCC may not explicitly answer the questions dealt
with, nor does it preclude application to a contract which has been enforced
in part or even entirely, as the main author of the code, E.M. Meijers, explains
the original draft of the article (which draft was not changed during the
parliamentary discussion on it, as far as relevant now, for that matter).2 Meijers
adds (l.c.) that the application is especially important with regard to a contract
which has been enforced only partly (i.e. the contract has not been enforced
by all the parties or the obligations out of the contract have been enforced only
1 The quotation is from the translation by H. Warendorf et al., The Civil Code of the Netherlands,
Kluwer Law International: Alphen aan de Rijn 2009. The translation by P.P.C. Haanappel
and E. Mackaaij (New Netherlands Civil Code/Nouveau Code Civil Néerlandais, Kluwer Law
and Taxation: Deventer/Boston 1990) differs only very slightly from that of Warendorf
et al. Both translations correctly underline that the question, whether the contract has to
be maintained in an unmodified form, is at stake (the verb to maintain means ‘handhaven’
or ‘in stand houden’ and corresponds to the substantive ‘instandhouding’.
2 Toelichting Meijers, Parlementaire Geschiedenis Boek 6, pp. 969-970.
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partly). The modification or setting aside of an agreement which has been
enforced entirely, will seldom be in accordance with reasonableness and
fairness, Meijers holds.3 The question what to think of this last observation
will be considered later on. Now, it is relevant to stress that this is not a
fundamental objection to the modification or setting aside of a contract which
has already been entirely or partly enforced, on the basis of unforeseen circum-
stances. On the contrary, Meijers seems to adopt such modification and setting
aside, in principle. What applies to a contract enforced entirely, must also be
applicable to (other) contracts which have expired. There is no reason to
assume that Meijers would have another view with regard to those contracts.
Especially the wording of art. 6:258 that regards the question whether an
existing contract has to be ‘maintained’, does not give a reason for that assump-
tion. The expiry of a contract from a certain date does not make it disappear,
it is still maintained. Then the question arises whether that contract still has
to be maintained for the period up till the expiry date.
Furthermore, the second sentence of art. 6:258 par. 1, which has been added
to the bill on Book 6 DCC while it was pending in parliament, indicates that
the judicial modification of entirely or partly enforced contracts is possible.
It permits retroactive effect of a judicial modification or setting aside to any
moment before the date of such judicial modification or setting aside. That
moment may be the date of a procedural document, such as a writ of summons
or a statement of defence, in which the possibility of modification or setting
aside because of unforeseen circumstances has been invoked in a concrete case.
It may also be situated before the civil procedure. Retroactive effect even seems
to be possible from the date of establishment of the contract itself. There is
no indication that the legislator would have been willing to limit the retroactive
effect to a certain period. Retroactive effect up to the date of the contract will
seldom be in accordance with reasonableness and fairness, Meijers could hold,
again, which will be also discussed later on. Important now is that retroactive
effect is permitted for -among others- contracts which have only been enforced
entirely or in part. Again, it may be held that what applies to a contract
enforced entirely must also be applicable to (other) contracts which have
expired. Therefore the second sentence of art. 6:258 par. 1 also suggests, albeit
slightly, that the judicial modification and setting aside of a contract which
has expired, is possible.
Summarizing, the legislator does not see any fundamental objections to
the judicial modification and setting aside of contracts already enforced or
expired. Meanwhile, he is of the view that the modification or setting aside
of a contract which has been entirely enforced will seldom be in accordance
3 Meijers refers to Karl Larenz, Geschäftsgrundlage und Vertragserfüllung, 1. Auflage, Beck:
München-Berlin 1951, p. 91 ff. See further, inter alia John Cartwright, Contract Law, An
Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer, Hart Publishing: Oxford and
Portland, Oregon 2007, p. 235, is of the same opinion.
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with reasonableness and fairness. Whether that last observation can be applied
to expired contracts per analogiam is another question. Both observations will
be considered in more detail under 4.
What about foreign laws? Provisions of foreign law do not explicitly deal
with the judicial modification and setting aside of contracts already enforced
or expired, as far as could be investigated. The same can be held for the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts (UNIDROIT) and the Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL): neither the UNIDROIT Principles nor the PECL
give a clear indication of the answer to our questions. See arts. 6.2.1-3 UNIDROIT
and art. 6:111 PECL. The same applies to art. III – 1:110 of the Draft Common
Frame of Reference (DCFR), which is similar to arts. 6.2.1-3 UNIDROIT. All these
texts give no explicit indication for a positive answer to the question, but there
is no opposition to the judicial modification or setting aside of enforced or
expired contracts on the basis of unforeseen circumstances either. A general
investigation of foreign case law and literature on domestic provisions, trans-
national principals and the DCFR did not really help to interpret these rules.
Foreign and transnational law will be left aside further.
4 MEANING OF REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS IN CASE OF CONTRACTS
ENTIRELY OR PARTLY ENFORCED OR EXPIRED
As pointed out under 3 the modification and setting aside of an agreement
which has been enforced entirely, will seldom be in accordance with reason-
ableness and fairness, in Meijers’s view. It is not clear what exactly Meijers
means in this respect. Maybe the underlying idea is that the severer the con-
sequences of modification or setting aside (in the sense of the effect of a
reversal of what has already been done), the greater the chance that such
modification or setting aside will not be in accordance with reasonableness
and fairness. However, the reason for modification or setting aside on the basis
of unforeseen circumstance is precisely that the consequences of maintenance
of the contract in unmodified form are so serious that the counter-party of
the person who seeks the modification or setting aside may not expect mainten-
ance in unmodified form and it is clear that a modification or setting aside
on that basis will not only be effected in details but in a substantial way. It
is clear nevertheless that the judge dealing with the claim for modification
or setting aside will also consider the negative consequences of it for the other
party and calculate the extent of that disadvantage for that party as a factor
in weighing the interest of the parties with regard to the question whether
the other party may expect the contract to be maintained without modification,
and if not allowed to expect so, to what extent the modification must be
accepted (the concept of ‘claim’ is intended as a quite general one here: the
modification and setting aside can also be informally demanded by the de-
fendant, as will be pointed out and discussed under 6). In other words, it can
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be held that the application of the legislator’s criteria of reasonableness and
fairness to a claim for modification and setting aside of an agreement which
has been entirely enforced or has expired requires a careful consideration of
the advantages and disadvantages of such modification or setting aside for
both parties to the contract. That can be held both with respect to the question
whether the claim has to be granted and – in case of an affirmative answer
to that question – to what extent the claim for modification or setting aside
has to be granted. The latter question is also an important one. The modifica-
tion or setting aside can be applied only to a part of the subject of the contract,
for instance, or only without retroactive effect or with limited retroactive effect.
That test against the requirements of reasonableness and fairness is not
an ordinary but a marginal one: the judge is only allowed to modify or set
aside the contract if and insofar as it is unacceptable in the light of the require-
ments of reasonableness and fairness to keep a party to unmodified main-
tenance of the contract. After all, art. 6:258 DCC is a codification of a specific
rule which was derived from art. 1374 par. 3 of the Old Civil Code, which,
according to case law under the Old Civil Code, provided in general for the
so-called contract-limiting effect of reasonableness and fairness, as art. 6:248
par. 2 DCC does now: a rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract
does not apply to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be
unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.4 Therefore,
the judge has to apply the legislator’s authorization to modify or set aside a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances with restraint and caution,
i.e. only in exceptional situations.5 In practice, it occurs very seldom indeed
that the judge modifies or sets aside a contract on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances.6
Altogether it may be concluded that the modification and setting aside
of contracts on the basis of unforeseen circumstances are only appropriate in
exceptional situations: it is only allowed if, and if so to the extent that, un-
modified maintenance of the contact is absolutely unacceptable according to
the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. There is no good reason in
principle to make it still more difficult in case of a contract which has been
enforced entirely or has expired.
4 Cfr. Voorlopig Verslag II and Memorie van Antwoord II, Parlementaire geschiedenis Boek
6, p. 971 resp. pp. 973-975. See further, inter alia Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III* (2010),
nr. 439.
5 Memorie van Antwoord, Parl. gesch. Boek 6, PG. See further, inter alia Asser/Hartkamp&
Sieburgh 6-III* (2010), nr. 444, Rechtshandeling en overeenkomst (W.L. Valk), Kluwer: Deventer
2007, nr. 288 and Attorney-General Wuisman in his ‘conclusie’ (official advice to the court)
in the case of Dutch Supreme Court 15 February 2008, NJ 2008, 110.
6 See for instance Dutch Supreme Court 19 November 1993, NJ 1994, 156, Dutch Supreme
Court 20 February 1998, NJ 1998, 493 and Dutch Supreme Court 21 March 2003, NJ 2003,
591, with commentary from JBMV.
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A fortiori, there is no good reason for making it more difficult in case the
contract has been enforced in part.7 On the contrary, modification or setting
aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances will just be claimed
very often, maybe even in the large majority of the cases, with regard to
contracts which have already been enforced in part. The legislator must certain-
ly have been willing to provide for the modification and setting aside of such
contracts.8
5 MODIFICATION OR SETTING ASIDE ON THE BASIS OF UNFORESEEN CIRCUM-
STANCES AFTER TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT, ANNULMENT WITHOUT
RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND SETTING ASIDE ON THE BASIS OF BREACH OF
CONTRACT
What to think of the modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances after termination of a contract for an indefinite
period? In fact the termination of the contract, if valid of course, transforms
the contract for an indefinite period to a contract for a definite one. There is
no difference between both types, except that the former is definite from the
beginning while the latter is made definite in the course of its duration. It may
be held that the answers to the questions as given before also apply to in-
definite contracts which have been terminated and therefore expired.
Now for the case of a contract which has been subjected to annulment
without retroactive effect to the time the contract was agreed. A contract does
not disappear as a result of an annulment. It is still maintained, albeit only
for the period from the date of agreement up till the date of annulment or
a date in between insofar as limited retroactive effect is given to the annulment.
Therefore such an annulled contract must be susceptible to modification and
setting aside on the basis of unforeseen circumstances arisen after the annul-
ment, albeit it only for the remaining period of the contract.
Finally a look at contracts which have been set aside on account of breach
of contract. Such setting aside does not have retroactive effect according to
present Dutch law (art. 6:269 DCC). Still, the setting aside releases the parties
from the obligations effected by it (art. 6:271, first sentence DCC). However,
to the extent that these obligations have already been performed, the legal
ground for this performance remains intact, albeit that the parties have the
obligation to reverse the performance of the obligations already performed
7 The Court of Appeal in ‘s-Hertogenbosch appeared to be of another view, without mention-
ing any argument therefor (Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch 11 April 2006, NJF 2006,
500). On the other hand, the Court of Appeal of Arnhem seems to be in favour of the
author’s opinion, albeit that it does not give any reasons for that either (Court of Appeal
Arnhem 14 July 2009, LJN BK6402).
8 See also P.S. Bakker and J.W. de Groot, WPNR 2009 (6797) under 5.
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(art. 6:271, second sentence DCC) or at least to compensate therefor by paying
damages in case the performance, given its nature, cannot be reversed (art.
6:272 DCC). Therefore, there is no interest for any party in the modification
or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances after
that contract has been set aside entirely on account of breach of contract. Only
in case of a partial setting aside on account of breach of contract (as art. 6:265,
par. 1 DCC in conjunction with art. 6:270 DCC permits respectively elaborates)
can such an interest still be there and if so, there is no reason why modification
or setting aside on the basis of unforeseen circumstances would not be allowed
then.
6 PRESCRIPTION AND FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS
The interim conclusion may be that the modification and setting aside of a
contract is possible on the basis of unforeseen circumstances arisen after the
enforcement or expiry of the contract. However, it is possible, of course, that
a claim for modification or setting aside in this matter is prescribed. Further-
more, it is possible that a claim in this matter will founder on forfeiture of
the right of action. Some remarks on these possibilities have to be made now,
but first some attention has to be paid to the concept of ‘claim’ in this matter.
As stated before, the concept of ‘claim’ is intended as a quite general one.
The original draft provision on modification and setting aside on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances allowed the interested party to institute court
proceedings for the modification and setting aside of a contract on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances by using the word ‘vordering’, i.e. a claim by the
original claimant in the action or by the defendant bringing a counterclaim.
In the final text of art. 6:258 DCC the word ‘vordering’ was changed by the
more neutral word ‘verlangen’ (i.e. demand), in order to provide not only a
possibility for a person to bring civil proceedings for the judicial modification
or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances, but
also by way of defence for the defendant or by way of an answer to a defence
for a claimant in a civil action for another claim. However, this change of
words was not necessary to achieve that the defendant or the claimant can,
by way of an answer to a defence in a civil action for another claim, seek to
gain a judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unfore-
seen circumstances. This modification or setting aside can be achieved by a
counterclaim of the defendant respectively an additional claim of the original
claimant (these being claims in a narrow sense). Obviously the legislator still
wants to allow the possibility of seeking the judicial modification or setting
aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances via another route,
notably by way of an informal demand by the original claimant or the de-
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fendant. What are we to think of this informal demand in connection with
the question of prescription?9
The legislator probably did not realise that through his use of the concept
of an informal demand, claimants and defendants could try to circumvent
the prescription. On the basis of the legislator’s wording, curious results in
the field of prescription could occur. What to think of an informal demand
of a claimant after prescription of his right of action (i.e. the ius agendi) for
instance? Whereas a claim for the judicial modification or setting aside of a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances should be dismissed due
to that prescription, an informal demand later on in the procedure should be
admissible. Still, there is a strong need for prescription of a ‘right of informal
demand’ after a long time as well. Legal certainty is involved here, as it is
involved with regard to the prescription of claims in a narrow sense. Therefore,
in the author’s opinion, the informal demand has to be dealt with in the same
way as a claim in a narrow sense. For both of these it must be held that the
right to initiate the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the
basis of unforeseen circumstances must be interpreted as the right of action
in the sense of the Dutch law of prescription. Thus, the right of an informal
demand to the judge in the sense of art. 6:258 DCC can be prescribed on the
same conditions as a right of action in a narrow sense.
However, there is no specific provision on that right of action with regard
to the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unfore-
seen circumstances in Dutch law. There is still a specific provision on the
prescription of a right of action to set aside a contract (art. 3:311 DCC), but this
provision only refers to setting aside for failure to perform. That is why the
general provision on prescription of rights of action is applicable (art. 3:306)
which states that unless otherwise provided for by law, a right of action is
prescribed on the expiry of twenty years. From what moment does this term
start? From the moment the unforeseen circumstances occur or the moment
when the interested party is aware of these circumstances? Keeping in mind
the length of the period, the former option seems to be the most appropriate
one, but there is no indication for it in the text or in the history of the law.
However, even in that former sense, the 20-year period is an extremely long
one in the author’s opinion. The right of action to set aside a contract for
nonperformance is prescribed on the expiry of five years from the moment
when the creditor becomes aware of the failure and only in other situations
on the expiry of twenty years after the failure occurred (art. 3:311 DCC). There
is no reason why a right of action to the judicial modification or setting aside
of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances should not be dealt with
in the same way, mutatis mutandis. The prescription would be better fixed on
five years from the moment when the interested party becomes aware of the
9 See more in general for instance H.J. Snijders et al., Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht, Kluwer:
Deventer 2011, no. 126.
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originally unforeseen circumstances and in any case not more than twenty
years after the originally unforeseen circumstances occurred. It looks as if the
legislator simply forgot to make a specific prescription provision on rights
of action with regard to unforeseen circumstances, possibly due to the fact
that the old Code did not provide for a right of action as laid down in the
present art. 6:258 DCC. Anyway, the ius constitutum does not provide for such
a limited prescription period. Perhaps our Dutch Supreme Court is willing
to interpret art. 3:311 per analogiam in the sense argued just now, but it is not
sure whether it will do so.
However, as far as prescription is not at stake, the right of action can be
forfeited. This will be the case if in the given circumstances, according to
standards of – again – reasonableness and fairness, it cannot be accepted
anymore that a right of action is used. In that case the right of action expires
as well, as in case of prescription. This forfeiture of rights has not been laid
down in Dutch legislation, but was adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court
under the old Civil Code and is still accepted by the Dutch Supreme Court
under the present one.
There is no occasion for an elaborate analysis of Dutch legal criteria for
forfeiture of rights now. Some remarks may suffice. According to case law,
neither the simple expiry of a certain period after a certain event nor simply
sitting around doing nothing is enough for the reception of forfeiture. For-
feiture of rights is only accepted in two situations. It is accepted if under the
specific circumstances of a case the debtor suffers an unreasonable disad-
vantage if the creditor would, after a certain period, still invoke his right of
action. It is also accepted if the debtor correctly trusted that the creditor would
not invoke his right of action anymore.10Application of this general rule to
the right of action to the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract
on the basis of unforeseen circumstances means that this right of action can
be forfeited a) if the debtor suffered an unreasonable disadvantage in case
the creditor, after a certain period, still invoked his right of action to modifica-
tion or setting aside and b) if the debtor was allowed to trust that the creditor
would not invoke his right of action anymore. In general, it is clear that the
longer a prescription period is, the sooner the judge will dismiss a claim
because of forfeiture of rights. An example of the latter may be found in the
situation in which a debtor, from the moment he is conscious of a certain,
hitherto unforeseen circumstance, still, without any objection, continues to
enforce the agreement, for instance through the continuous annual payment,
without any objection, of the agreed amount for depreciation costs as could
occur in the case of section 1 supra.
The question of the forfeiture of rights precedes the substantive treatment
of a claim for the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the
10 See further for instance Verbintenissenrecht (W.L. Valk), loose-leaf and e-edition, Kluwer:
Deventer, art. 2, notes 1 ff.
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basis of unforeseen circumstances, because in case of forfeiture the claim will
not be admissible. The substantive treatment of that claim is not at stake
anymore in that case. However, the arguments in favour of forfeiture in a
certain case can be, entirely or partly, the same as the arguments in favour
of rejection of the claim for the judicial modification or setting aside of a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances. This phenomenon is not
that strange. Both legal concepts – judicial modification or setting aside of a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances and forfeiture of rights of
action – have a common assessment framework: the tandem of reasonableness
and fairness in its correcting function as laid down in art. 6:2 par. 2 DCC and
art. 6:248 par. 2 DCC.
7 SUMMARY AND FINAL REMARKS
It is clear now, how the case of section 1 should be decided. The single fact
that the contract has already been (entirely or partly) enforced or has already
expired does not prevent a judicial modification or setting aside of the contract.
A’s argument that the contract has already been enforced and expired, and
that judicial modification of the contract is therefore not acceptable, fails.
However, the enforcement and expiry arguments are still relevant. A’s
claim for the modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unfore-
seen circumstance can be granted and can be granted only if the consequences
of maintenance of the contract in unmodified form are so serious that the
counter-party of the person who wants the modification or setting aside may
not expect maintenance in unmodified form. The judge, dealing with such
a claim for modification or setting aside, will also consider the negative con-
sequences of it for the counter-party and calculate the extent of that disad-
vantage for that party as a factor in weighing the interest of the parties with
regard to the question whether the counter-party may expect the contract
maintained without modification, and if it is not allowed to expect so, to what
extent the modification must be accepted. It can be held that the application
of the legislator’s criteria of reasonableness and fairness to a claim for the
modification and setting aside of an agreement which has been entirely
enforced or has expired, requires a careful consideration of the advantages
and disadvantages of such modification or setting aside for both parties to
the contract. It can be held both to the question whether the claim has to be
granted and – in case of an affirmative answer to that question – to what extent
the claim for modification or setting aside has to be granted.
That test against the requirements of reasonableness and fairness is not
an ordinary but a marginal one: the judge is only allowed to modify or set
aside the contract if and insofar as it is unacceptable in the light of the require-
ments of reasonableness and fairness to keep a party to unmodified mainten-
ance of the contract. Modification and setting aside of contracts on the basis
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of unforeseen circumstances are only appropriate in exceptional situations:
it is only allowed if and insofar as unmodified maintenance of the contact is
absolutely unacceptable according to the requirements of reasonableness and
fairness.
Questions of prescription and forfeiture of rights precede the substantial
question whether a claim for modification or setting aside of a contract on
the basis of unforeseen circumstances has to be granted. Prescription is not
often an issue in practice, due to the long prescription period (20 years).
Forfeiture of rights is at stake more. The right of action to judicial modification
or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances can be
forfeited if the debtor was allowed to trust that the creditor would not invoke
his right of action anymore or if this put the debtor at an unreasonable dis-
advantage.

